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Path to Stochastic Stability: Comparative Analysis
of Stochastic Learning Dynamics in Games
Hassan Jaleel and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract—Stochastic stability is a popular solution concept
for stochastic learning dynamics in games. However, a critical
limitation of this solution concept is its inability to distinguish
between different learning rules that lead to the same steady-
state behavior. We address this limitation for the first time and
develop a framework for the comparative analysis of stochastic
learning dynamics with different update rules but same steady-
state behavior. We present the framework in the context of two
learning dynamics: Log-Linear Learning (LLL) and Metropolis
Learning (ML). Although both of these dynamics have the
same stochastically stable states, LLL and ML correspond to
different behavioral models for decision making. Moreover, we
demonstrate through an example setup of sensor coverage game
that for each of these dynamics, the paths to stochastically
stable states exhibit distinctive behaviors. Therefore, we propose
multiple criteria to analyze and quantify the differences in the
short and medium run behavior of stochastic learning dynamics.
We derive and compare upper bounds on the expected hitting
time to the set of Nash equilibria for both LLL and ML. For the
medium to long-run behavior, we identify a set of tools from the
theory of perturbed Markov chains that result in a hierarchical
decomposition of the state space into collections of states called
cycles. We compare LLL and ML based on the proposed criteria
and develop invaluable insights into the comparative behavior of
the two dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic learning dynamics, like log-linear learning, ad-
dress the issue of equilibrium selection for a class of games
that includes potential games (see, e.g., [1], [2], [3] and [4]).
Because of the equilibrium selection property, these learning
dynamics have received significant attention, particularly in the
context of opinion dynamics in coordination games (see, e.g.,
[2] and [5]) and game theoretic approaches to the distributed
control of multiagent systems [6].
A well-known problem of stochastic learning dynamics is
the slow mixing of their induced Markov chain [2], [7], [8].
The mixing time of a Markov chain is the time required by the
chain to converge to its stationary behavior. This mixing time
is crucial because the definition of a stochastically stable state
depends on the stationary distribution of the Markov chain
induced by a learning dynamics. The slow mixing time implies
that the behavior of these dynamics in the short and medium
run are equally important particularly for engineered systems
with a limited lifetime. However, stochastic stability only deals
with the steady-state behavior and provides no information
about the transient behavior of these dynamics.
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The speed of convergence of stochastic learning dynamics
is an active area of research that is receiving significant
research attention [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], and [14]. However,
there is another aspect related to the slow convergence of
these dynamics that has received relatively little research
attention. Stochastic stability only explains the steady-state
behavior of a system under a learning rule. We establish that
there are learning dynamics with considerably different update
rules that lead to the same steady-state behavior. Since these
learning dynamics have the same stochastically stable states,
stochastic stability cannot distinguish between these dynamics.
The different update rules may result in significantly different
behaviors over short and medium run that may be desirable
or undesirable but remain entirely unnoticed.
We first establish the implications of having different learn-
ing rules with the same steady state. Through an example
setup, we demonstrate the differences in short and medium run
behaviors for two particular learning dynamics with different
update rules that lead to the same stochastically stable states.
The example setup is that of sensor coverage game in which
we formulate a sensor coverage problem in the framework
of a potential game. An important conclusion that we draw
from this comparison is that for stochastic learning dynamics,
characterization of stochastically stable states is not sufficient.
It is also essential to analyze the paths that lead to these
stochastically stable states from any given initial condition.
Analysis of these paths is critical because there are specific
properties of these paths that play a crucial role not only in
the short and medium run but also in the long run steady state
behavior of the system.
The transient behavior of stochastic dynamics was studied in
the context of learning in games in [15] and [16]. However, the
issues related to various learning dynamics leading to the same
steady state behavior were not highlighted in these works.
Therefore, after motivating the problem, we propose a novel
framework for performing a comparative analysis of different
stochastic learning dynamics with the same steady state. The
proposed framework is based on the theory of Markov chains
with rare transitions [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], and [23].
In the proposed framework, we present multiple criteria for
comparing the short, medium, and long-run behaviors of a
system under different learning dynamics. We refer to the
analysis related to the short-run behavior as first order analysis.
The first order analysis deals with the expected hitting time
of the set of pure Nash equilibria, which is the expected time
to reach a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the first time. Because
of the known hardness results of computing a NE [24], [25],
and the fact that all the Nash equilibria of a potential game
are not necessarily potential maximizer, the first order analysis
2is typically not considered for stochastic learning dynamics.
However, we are interested in the comparative analysis of
learning dynamics for which we show that first-order analysis
provides valuable insights into the behavior of a system.
We refer to the analysis related to the medium and long-
run behavior of stochastic learning dynamics as higher-order
analysis. The higher-order analysis is based on the fact that
the Markov chains induced by stochastic learning dynamics
explore the space of joint action profiles hierarchically. This
hierarchical exploration of the state space is well explained
by an iterative decomposition of the state space into cycles of
different orders as shown in [17], [19], [18], and [26]. Thus,
the evolution of Markov chains with rare transitions can be
well approximated by transitions among cycles of proper order.
Therefore, we develop our higher order analysis on the cycle
decomposition of the state space as presented in [27]. We
compare the behavior of different learning rules by comparing
the exit height He, and the mixing height Hm of the cycles
generated by the cycle decomposition algorithm applied to
these learning rule. The significance of these parameters is
that once a Markov chain enters a cycle, the time to exit the
cycle is of the order of e
He
T and the time to visit each state
within a cycle before exiting is of the order of e
Hm
T . Thus, we
can efficiently characterize the behavior of each cycle from
He and Hm.
Our comparative analysis framework applies to the class of
learning dynamics in which the induced Markov chains satisfy
certain regularity conditions. However, we present the details
of the framework in the context of two particular learning dy-
namics, Log-Linear Learning (LLL) and Metropolis Learning
(ML) over potential games. Log-Linear learning is a noisy
best response dynamics in which the probability of a noisy
action from a player is inversely related to the cost of deviating
from the best response. This learning rule is well-known in
game theory and the stationary distribution of the induced
Markov chain is a Gibbs distribution, which depends on a
potential function. The Gibbs distribution over the space of
joint action profiles assigns the maximum probability to the
action profiles that maximize the potential function. Moreover,
it was shown in [28] that LLL is a good behavioral model for
decision making when the players have sufficient information
to compute their utilities for all the actions in their action set
given the actions of other players in the game.
On the other hand, Metropolis learning is a noisy better
response dynamics for which the induced Markov chain is
a Metropolis chain. It is well established in the statistical
mechanics literature that the unique stationary distribution of
Metropolis chain is the Gibbs distribution (see, e.g., [18] and
[20]). As a behavioral model for decision making, ML is
related closely to the pairwise comparison dynamics presented
in [29]. Thus, ML is a behavioral model for decision making
with low information demand. A player only needs to compare
its current payoff with the payoff of a randomly selected
action. It does not need to know the payoffs for all the actions
as in LLL. The only assumption is that each player has the
ability or the resources to compute the payoff for one randomly
selected action.
Hence, we have two learning dynamics, LLL and ML,
which correspond to two behavioral models for decision mak-
ing with very different information requirements. However,
both of the learning rules lead to the same steady-state
behavior. We compare these learning dynamics based on the
proposed framework. The crux of our comparative analysis is
that the availability of more information in the case of LLL as
compared to ML does not guarantee better performance when
the performance criterion is to reach the potential maximizer
quickly.
A summary of our main contributions in this work is as
follows
Contributions
• For problem motivation, we present our setup of sen-
sor coverage game in which we formulate the sensor
coverage problem with random sensor deployment as a
potential game.
• For the first order analysis, we derive and compare upper
bounds on the expected hitting time to the set of NE for
both LLL and ML.
• We also obtain a sufficient condition to guarantee a
smaller expected hitting time to the set of Nash equilibria
under LLL than ML from any initial condition.
• For higher order analysis, we identify cycle decomposi-
tion algorithm as a useful tool for the comparative anal-
ysis of stochastic learning dynamics. Moreover, we show
through an example of a simple Markov chain that cycle
decomposition algorithm is also suitable for describing
system behavior at different levels of abstraction.
• We compare the exit heights and mixing heights of cycles
under LLL and ML. We show that if a subset of state
space is a cycle under both LLL and ML, then the mixing
and exit heights of that cycle will always be smaller for
ML as compared to LLL.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminaries
We denote the cardinality of a set S by |S|. For a vector
x ∈ Rn, xi denotes its i
th entry and |x| is its Euclidean norm.
The Hamming distance between any two vectors x and y in
R
n is
dH(x, y) = |{i | xi 6= yi}|. (1)
∆(n) denotes the n−dimensional probability simplex, i.e.,
∆(n) = {µ ∈ Rn | 1Tµ = 1, µi ≥ 0}
where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) is a column vector in Rn with all the
entries equal to 1.
B. Markov Chains
A discrete time Markov chain on a finite state space S =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is a random process that consists of a sequence
of random variables X = (X0, X1, . . .) such that Xt ∈ S for
all t ≥ 0 and
P (Xt+1 = x|X0 = x0, . . . , Xt = xt) =
P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = xt)
3where x ∈ S and xk ∈ S for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}. Let P
be the transition matrix for Markov chain X and P (x, y) be
the transition probability from state x to y. A distribution π ∈
∆(n) is a stationary distribution with respect to P if
πT = πTP.
If a Markov chain is ergodic and reversible, then it has a
unique stationary distribution, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
µT0 P
t = πT
for all µ0 ∈ ∆(n). The following definitions are adapted from
[2].
Definition 2.1: Let P0 be a transition matrix for a Markov
chain over state space S. Let Pǫ be a family of perturbed
Markov chains on S for sufficiently small ǫ corresponding to
P0. We say that Pǫ is a regular perturbation of P0 if
1) Pǫ is ergodic for sufficiently small ǫ,
2) lim
ǫ→0
Pǫ(x, y) = P0(x, y), and
3) Pǫ(x, y) > 0 for some ǫ > 0 implies that there exists
some function R(x, y) ≥ 0 such that
0 < lim
ǫ→0
Pǫ(x, y)
ǫR(x,y)
<∞.
where R(x, y) ≥ 0 is the cost of transition from x to y and
is normally referred to as resistance.
The Markov process corresponding to Pǫ is called a regu-
larly perturbed Markov process.
Definition 2.2: Let Pǫ be a regular perturbation of P0 with
stationary distribution πǫ. A state x ∈ S is a stochastically
stable state if
lim
ǫ→0
πǫ(x) > 0.
Thus, any state that is not stochastically stable will have a
vanishingly small probability of occurrence in the steady state
as ǫ→ 0.
Given any two states x and y in S, y is reachable from x
(x → y) if P t(x, y) > 0 for some t ≥ 0. The neighborhood
of x is
Nh(x) = {y ∈ S | P (x, y) > 0}
A path ωSx,y between any two states x and y in S is a sequence
of distinct states (ω0, ω1, . . . , ωk) such that ω0 = x, ωk =
y, ωi ∈ S, ωi 6= ωi+1 and P (ωi, ωi+1) > 0 for all i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , k− 1}. The length of the path is denoted as |ωSx,y|.
The superscript S will be ignored in path notation when the
state space is clear from the context. Given a set A ⊂ S and a
path ωSx,y, we say that ω
S
x,y ∈ A if z ∈ A for all z ∈ ω
S
x,y. We
define ΩS(x, y) as the set of all paths between states x and y
in state space S. States x and y communicate with each other
(x↔ y) if the sets ΩS(x, y) and ΩS(y, x) are not empty.
Definition 2.3: A set A ⊆ S is connected if x↔ y for every
x, y ∈ S.
Definition 2.4: The hitting time of x ∈ S is the first time it
is visited, i.e.,
τx = min{t ≥ 0 : Xt = x}
The hitting time of a set A ⊆ S is the first time one of the
states of A is visited, i.e.,
τA = min
x∈A
τx.
Definition 2.5: The exit time of a Markov chain from A ⊂ S
is τ∂A, where
∂A = {y ∈ Ac : P (x, y) > 0 for some x ∈ A}
where Ac = S\A. We will refer to ∂A as the boundary of A.
In the above definition it is assumed that X0 ∈ A.
C. Game Theory
Let Np = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n strategic players
in which each player i has a finite set of strategies Ai =
{1, 2, . . . ,mi}. The utility of each player is represented by a
utility function Ui : A → R where A = A1 ×A2 . . .× An is
the set of joint action profiles. The combination of the action
of the ith player and the actions of everyone else is represented
by (ai, a−i). The joint action profiles of all the players except
i are represented by the set
A−i = A1 ×A2 × . . .×Ai−1 ×Ai+1 × . . . An
Player i prefers action profile a = (α, a−i) over a
′ =
(α′, a−i), where α and α
′ ∈ Ai, if and only if Ui(a) > Ui(a
′).
If Ui(a) = Ui(a
′), then it is indifferent to both the actions.
An action profile a∗ ∈ A is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if
Ui(α, a
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(α
∗, a∗−i)
for all i ∈ Np and α ∈ Ai. The best response set of player i
given an action profile a−i ∈ A−i is
Bi(a−i) = {α
∗ ∈ Ai : Ui(α
∗, a−i) = max
α∈Ai
Ui(α, a−i)}
The set of all possible best responses from an action profile a
is
B(a) =
n⋃
i=1
Bi(a−i)
The neighborhood of an action profile a is
Nh(a) = {a
′ ∈ A | dH(a, a
′) = 1}.
The agent specific neighborhood set of action profile a is
Nh(a, i) = {a
′ ∈ A | a′i ∈ Ai, a
′
−i = a−i}
Potential Game: A game is a potential game if there exists a
real valued function φ : A → R such that
Ui(α, a−i)− Ui(α¯, a−i) = φ(α, a−i)− φ(α¯, a−i)
for all i ∈ Np and for all α, α¯ ∈ Ai. The function φ is called
a potential function.
III. STOCHASTIC LEARNING DYNAMICS
Stochastic learning dynamics is a class of learning dynamics
in games in which the players typically play best/better reply to
the actions of other players. However, the players sporadically
play noisy actions for exploration because of which these
dynamics have equilibrium selection property for a class of
games like potential games.
4A. Log-Linear Learning (LLL)
Let a = (α, a−i) be the joint action profile representing the
current state of the game. Then, the steps involved in LLL are
as follows.
1) Activate one of the n players, say player i, uniformly at
random.
2) All other players repeat their previous actions.
3) Player i selects an action α′ ∈ Ai with the following
probability
pLLLi (α
′, a−i) =
e−
1
T (Ui(α
∗,a−i)−Ui(α
′,a−i))
Zi(a−i)
(2)
Zi(a−i) =
∑
α¯∈Ai
e−
1
T
(Ui(α
∗,a−i)−Ui(α¯,a−i)).
Here Zi(a−i) is a normalizing constant, α
∗ ∈ Bi(a−i)
is a best response of player i to a−i, and
lim
T→0
Zi(a−i) = |Bi(a−i)|.
In (2), T is the noise parameter, normally referred to as
temperature. For T = ∞, the players update their strategies
uniformly at random. However, as T → 0, the probability of
the actions yielding higher utilities increases.
Thus, LLL induces a Markov chain XLLL over the joint
action profile A with transition matrix PLLLT . The transition
probability between any two distinct action profiles a and a′
is
PLLLT (a, a
′) =
1
n
{
0 dH(a, a
′) > 1,
pLLLi (α
′, a−i) a
′ ∈ Nh(a, i)
It was shown in [30] that PLLLT for LLL is a regular
perturbation of P0 with ǫ = e
−1/T . That is why we have used
the notation PT instead of Pǫ. Here, P0 is the transition matrix
of the Markov chain induced by sequential best response
dynamics. It was also proved in [30] that in an n-player
potential game with a potential function φ, if all the agents
update their actions based on LLL, then the only stochastically
stable states are the potential maximizers. The stationary
distribution for XLLL is the Gibbs distribution
πLLL(a) =
1
Z
e
1
T
φ(a) (3)
where Z =
∑
y∈A
e
1
T
φ(y) is the normalizing constant.
B. Metropolis Learning (ML)
We introduce another learning dynamics that has the same
stationary distribution as in (3). We refer to it as Metropolis
Learning (ML) because the Markov chain induced by ML is a
Metropolis chain, which is well studied in statistical mechanics
and in simulated annealing [20]. The steps involved in ML are
as follows.
1) Activate one of the n players, say player i, uniformly at
random.
2) All other players repeat their previous actions.
3) Player i selects an action α′ ∈ Ai uniformly at random.
4) Player i switches its action form α to α′ with probability
min{1, e−
1
T
(Ui(α,a−i)−Ui(α
′,a−i))}.
Thus, the probability of transition from a = (α, a−i) to a
′ =
(α′, a−i) is
pMLi (a, a
′) =
1
|Ai|
e−
1
T
[Ui(α,a−i)−Ui(α
′,a−i)]
+
, (4)
where c+ = c if c > 0 and is equal to zero otherwise.
In ML, player i switches to a randomly selected action
α′ ∈ Ai with probability one as long as Ui(α
′, a−i) ≥
Ui(α, a−i). Here, α is the action that player i was playing
in the previous time slot. Thus, unlike LLL in which a player
needs to compute the utilities for all the actions in its action
set given a−i, the update in ML only requires a player to
make a pairwise comparison between a randomly selected
action and its previous action. Furthermore, the probability
of a noisy action is a function of loss in payoff as compared
to the previous action.
Metropolis learning generates a Markov Chain XML over
joint action profile A with transition matrix PMLT . The transi-
tion probability between any two distinct action profiles a and
a′ is
PMLT (a, a
′) =
1
n
{
0 dH(a, a
′) > 1
pi,ML(a, a
′) a′ ∈ Nh(a, i)
Next we show that PMLT is a regularly perturbed Markov
process.
Lemma 3.1: Transition matrix PMLT is a regular pertur-
bation of Pbr , where Pbr is the transition matrix for asyn-
chronous better reply dynamics. Moreover, the resistance of
any feasible transition from a = (α, a−i) to a
′ = (α′, a−i) is
R(a, a′) = [Ui(α, a)− Ui(α
′, a−i)]
+ (5)
Proof: To prove that PMLT is a regular perturbation, we
first describe the unperturbed process which is asynchronous
better reply dynamics. The unperturbed process has the fol-
lowing dynamics.
1) A player, say i, is selected at random.
2) All the other players repeat their previous actions.
3) Player i selects an action α′ uniformly at random.
4) Player i switches its action from α to α′ if
Ui(α, a−i) ≤ Ui(α
′, a−i).
Otherwise, it repeats α. Thus
Pbr(a, a
′) =
1
n|Ai|
Similar to LLL, the noise parameter ǫ = e−
1
T . The Metropolis
chain XML is ergodic for a given ǫ > 0 and it satisfies
lim
ǫ→0
PMLT (x, y) = Pbr(x, y). For the final condition
lim
ǫ→0
PMLT (a, a
′)
ǫ[Ui(α,a)−Ui(α′,a−i)]+
=
1
n|Ai|
∈ (0,∞),
where R(a, a′) ≥ 0 for any given pair a and a′. Thus, PMLT
is a regular perturbation of Pbr.
5The important fact regarding ML in the context of this
work is that the stationary distribution πML is also the Gibbs
distribution, i.e.,
πML(a) = πLLL(a) =
1
Z
e
1
T
φ(a). (6)
Thus, from the perspective of stochastic stability, both LLL
and ML are precisely the same. To observe and understand
the effects of different update rules on system behavior, we
simulated a sensor coverage game with both LLL and ML.
Next, we present the setup and the results of the simulation.
IV. MOTIVATION: SENSOR COVERAGE PROBLEM
To study the difference in behaviors between LLL and ML,
which is ignored under stochastic stability, we set up sensor
coverage problem as a potential game. Through extensive
simulations under various noise conditions, we exhibit the
essential differences between the behavior of these learning
dynamics in the short and medium runs. We want to mention
here that this formulation of sensor coverage problem with
random sensor deployment in a potential game theoretic
framework is also a contribution and can be of independent
interest in the context of local scheduling schemes for sensor
coverage problem.
A. Coverage Game Setup
Consider a scenario in which N sensors are deployed
randomly to monitor an environment D ⊂ R2 for a long
period of time. We approximateD with a square region defined
over intervals [0, d] × [0, d]. To simplify the problem, the
area is discretized as a 2-dimensional grid represented by the
Cartesian product {0, 1, . . . , d}×{0, 1, . . . , d}. The location of
each sensor i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is xi ∈ R
2 where xi ∼ unif(D),
i.e., xi is a random variable uniformly distributed over the
region of interest D. The footprint of sensor i is a circular
disk of radius r, i.e.,
F (xi, r) = {z ∈ R
2 s.t. ‖z − xi‖
2 ≤ r},
We assume that each sensor can choose the radius of its
footprint from a finite set, which determines its energy con-
sumption. Let rc be the communication range of each sensor.
We assume that rc ≥ 2rmax, where rmax is the maximum
sensing radius.
We propose a game-theoretic solution to the sensor coverage
problem in which we formulate the problem as a strategic
game and implement some local learning rule so that each sen-
sor can learn its schedule based on local information only. The
players in this game are the sensors and each player has mi
actions, i.e., Np = {1, 2, . . . , N} and Ai = {r0, r1, . . . , rmi}.
Here, an action of a player is its sensing radius. For each
sensor, r0 = 0, which is the off state of a sensor. The joint
action profile is the joint state of all the sensors.
Let pkl = (xk, yl) be a point on the grid where k, l ∈
{0, 1, . . . , d}. The state of a grid point is whether it is covered
or uncovered, i.e.,
c(pkl) =
{
1 ∃ i ∈ Np | xi ∈ F (pkl, ai) and ai 6= r0
0 Otherwise
Thus, the objective is to solve the following optimization
problem.
max
a∈A
G(a) = max
a∈A
(U(a)− C(a)),
where
U(a) =
∑
k
∑
l
c(pkl)
is the total coverage achieved by the sensor network and
C(a) =
N∑
i=1
Ci(ai)
is the total cost incurred by the sensors that are on. We assume
that Ci(a0) = 0, i.e., no cost is incurred by the sensors that
are off.
The local utility of each player is computed through
marginal contribution utility as explained in [31] with base
action abi = r0, i.e., the base action of each sensor is to be
in the off state in which there is no energy consumption. If
a−i is the joint state of all the other sensors, then the utility
of player i for action ai is
Ui(ai, a−i) = G(ai, a−i)−G(a
b
i , a−i).
The above equation implies that Ui(a
b
i , a−i) = 0. For any
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mi}
Ui(rk, a−i) = U(rk, a−i)−
N∑
j=1
ai=rk
Cj(aj)
− U(r0, a−i)−
N∑
j=1
ai=r0
Cj(aj)
= [U(rk, a−i)− U(r0, a−i)]− Ci(ai)
Thus, the marginal contribution utility of sensor i with action
ai is the number of grid points that are covered by the sensor
exclusively with footprint of radius ai minus the cost Ci(ai).
To make the payoff and the cost terms in Ui compatible,
we express the cost of turning a sensor on as a function of the
minimum number of grid points that a sensor should cover
exclusively. Let Rmax(r) be the maximum number of grid
points that a sensor can cover if its footprint has radius r. We
define the cost as
Ci(ai) = ceil(αRmax(ai)) for α ∈ (0, 1].
Thus, the net utility of a sensor is negative if the number of
points it covers exclusively is less than Ci(ai) given a−i.
B. Simulation Results
We simulated the sensor coverage game with d = 20, n =
15, α = 0.2, and Ai = {0, 15} for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 15}. For
this setup, the maximum global utility was
max
a∈A
G(a) = 247,
which was computed numerically based on extensive simula-
tions. To achieve the maximum payoff, we implemented LLL
and ML with different values for the noise parameter T and
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Fig. 1. System performance under LLL and ML for T = 0.001.
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Fig. 2. System performance under LLL and ML for different noise conditions.
the number of iterations iter. The results of the simulation are
presented in Figs. 1 and 2.
Initially, all the sensors were in the off state. To compare
the short-term behavior of the network with small noise, we
set T = 0.001 and ran the simulation for twenty times for
both LLL and ML with iter = 100. Since players were
randomly selected to update their actions at each decision time,
each simulation led to a different system configuration in one
hundred iterations even with the same initial condition. The
results of twenty simulations are presented in Fig. 1. In Fig.
1(a), we show the number of iterations to reach a NE for the
first time under LLL and ML. Based on the results in Fig. 1(a),
the average number of iterations to reach a NE for the first
time under LLL and ML were 43.15 and 63.75 respectively.
Thus, on average, the system reached a NE faster under LLL
than ML.
For a system with multiple Nash equilibria, reaching a NE
faster is not the only objective. The quality of the NE is
also a significant factor. In Fig. 1(b), we present the global
payoff at the Nash equilibria reached under LLL and ML
in our twenty simulations. The global payoffs at the Nash
equilibria under LLL and ML had a mean value of 229.6 and
230.1, and a standard deviation of 8.39 and 12.49 respectively.
Although the average global payoffs were almost equal, the
higher standard deviation under ML implies that ML explored
the state space more as compared to LLL. As of result of this
higher exploration tendency, the system achieved the global
maximum of 247 three times under ML and only one time
under LLL.
Thus, based on the comparisons from Fig. 1, LLL seems
to be better than ML because it can lead to a NE faster
on average. However, ML seems to have a slight edge over
LLL if we consider the quality of the Nash equilibria. This
observation provides a strong rationale for comprehensive
comparative analysis because we cannot simply declare one
learning rule better than the other.
For higher order analysis, the objective was to observe and
compare system behavior over an extended period. For com-
parison, we were interested in the following crucial aspects.
• Time to reach a payoff maximizing NE under each
learning dynamics.
• The paths adopted to reach the payoff-maximizing NE
and their characteristics.
• System behavior after reaching a payoff maximizing NE.
Therefore, we simulated the system for 106 iterations with
T = 0.001 and T = 0.004, and for 50 × 103 iterations
with T = 0.0096. The results are presented in Figs 2(a)-2(c)
respectively.
For T = 0.001, optimal configuration could not be achieved
under both LLL and ML even in 106 iterations. For LLL,
the network remained stuck at some NE for 106 iterations.
Under ML, there was a single switch in network configuration
after approximately 20× 103 from one NE to another. As we
increased the noise to T = 0.004, payoff maximizing con-
figurations were reached under both LLL and ML. However,
the number of iterations to reach these optimal configurations
were huge, particularly in LLL. Finally, for T = 0.0096, the
optimal configurations were reached rapidly.
The ability of ML to stay at an optimal configuration after
reaching it is affected more by noise as compared to LLL.
In Fig. 2(a) with T = 0.001, the network configuration
switched from one NE to another under ML, but there was no
switch under LLL. In Fig. 2(b) with T = 0.004, the network
configuration switched to an optimal NE quickly under ML
then under LLL. Finally, the increase of noise T = 0.0096
led to an interesting behavior that can be observed in Fig.
2(c). Under ML, the network configuration kept on leaving the
payoff-maximizing configurations periodically for a significant
duration of times. However, under LLL, after reaching an
optimal configuration, the network never left the configuration
for long durations of time. Every time it left the optimal
configuration because of noise, it immediately switched back.
We can summarize the observations from the simulation setup
as follows
1) In short run, LLL can drive network configuration to a
NE quickly as compared to ML.
72) In short, medium, and long run, starting from the same
initial condition, LLL and ML can drive network con-
figurations along entirely different paths that lead to the
payoff-maximizing configurations in the long run.
3) The effect of noise on LLL and ML is significantly
different.
From the above observations, we can conclude that the
concept of stochastic stability alone is not sufficient to describe
the behavior of stochastic learning dynamics. However, these
observations are based on the simulation of a particular system
under certain conditions, which prohibits us from drawing any
general conclusions regarding the behavior of these learning
rules. Therefore, we present a general framework to analyze
and compare the behavior of different learning rules that have
the same stochastically stable states. We establish that the
setup of Cycle Decomposition is useful for the comparative
analysis of learning dynamics in games. In particular, we
identify and compare the parameters that enable us to explain
the system behavior that we observed in the motivating setup
of sensor coverage games.
V. CYCLE DECOMPOSITION
Consider a Markov chain X on a finite state space S =
{1, 2, . . . , N} with transition matrix PT . We assume that the
transition matrix satisfies the following property.
ΓT e
− 1
T
V (x,y) ≤ PT (x, y) ≤
1
ΓT
e−
1
T
V (x,y) (7)
where ΓT > 0 for T > 0 and
lim
T→0
T ln ΓT = 0. (8)
Here V : S × S → R+ ∪∞ is defined as follows{
V (x, y) ≥ 0 PT (x, y) > 0
V (x, y) =∞ PT (x, y) = 0.
For any (x, y) pair, V (x, y) can be considered as a transition
cost from x to y. It is assumed that the function V is
irreducible, which implies that for any state pair (x, y), there
exists a path ωSx,y of length k such that
V (ωSx,y) =
k−1∑
i=0
V (ωi, ωi+1) <∞
Definition 5.1: A function V : S×S → R+∪∞ is induced
by a potential function φ : S → R if, for all x and y in S, the
following weak reversibility condition is satisfied.
φ(x) − V (x, y) = φ(y)− V (y, x) (9)
The following result is from [32] (Prop. 4.1).
Proposition 5.1: Let (X,PT ) be a family of Markov chains
over state space S such that the transition matrices PT satisfy
(7) and (8). If the function V is induced by a potential φ as
defined in Def. 5.1, then the stationary distribution πT is such
that
lim
T→0
−T lnπT (x) = max
y∈S
(φ(y) − φ(x))
Thus, in the limit as T → 0, only the states maximizing the
potential will have a non-zero probability. Based on Prop. 5.1,
there is an entire class of Markov chains that lead to potential
maximizers. We want to mention here that the results in [32]
were for minimizing a potential function. Since we are dealing
with maximizing a payoff, all the definitions and results are
adapted accordingly.
A. Cycle Decomposition Algorithm
Cycle Decomposition Algorithm (CDA) was presented in
[26], based on the ideas originally presented in [17]. It was
presented to study the transient behavior of Markov chains that
satisfy (7), (8), and (9) and lead to the stationary distribution
defined in Prop. 5.1. In this algorithm, the state space is
decomposed into unique cycles in an iterative procedure. The
formal definition of cycle as presented in [32] and [21] is as
follows
Definition 5.2: A set Π ⊂ S is a cycle if it is a singleton
or it satisfies either of the two conditions.
1) For any x, y in Π, x 6= y
lim
T→0
−T lnPT (Xτ(Πc∪{y}) 6= y | X0 = x) > 0
2) For any x, y in Π, x 6= y
lim
T→0
T lnET (NΠ(x, y) | X0 = x) > 0
where NΠ(x, y) is the number of round trips including
x and y performed by the chain X before leaving Π.
The first condition simply means that a subset Π is a cycle if
starting from some x ∈ Π, the probability of leaving Π before
visiting every state y ∈ Π is exponentially small. Thus,
lim
T→0
PT (Xτ(Πc∪{y}) = y | X0 = x) = 1.
The second statement states that the expected number of times
each y ∈ Π is visited by X starting from any x ∈ Π is
exponentially large.
For higher order comparative analysis, we first decompose
the state space into cycles via CDA. Then, we compare the
properties of the cycles under each learning dynamics. For
the completeness of presentation, we reproduce CDA in Alg.
1. The outcome of CDA as presented in Alg. 1 is the set C
defined in (12). To explain system behavior using CDA, we
need the following definitions and results, which are mostly
adopted from [26].
The minimum cost of leaving a state x is
He(x) = min
y∈S
y 6=x
V (x, y).
We will refer to He(x) as the exit height of state x. For any
set of states x and y such that PT (x, y) > 0, we define
V∗(x, y) =
{
V (x, y)−He(x) x 6= y
0 x = y
i.e., V∗(x, y) is the excess cost above the minimum transition
cost form x. For a path ω := (ω0, ω1, . . . , ωk)
V∗(w) =
k−1∑
i=0
V∗(ωi, ωi+1).
8The exterior boundary of set A is
∂extA = {y ∈ S\A : ∃x ∈ A,PT (x, y) > 0}.
The interior boundary of set A is
∂intA = {x ∈ A | ∃y ∈ S\A,PT (x, y) > 0}.
We say that a cycle is non-trivial if it has a non-zero exit
height. Thus, a singleton is non-trivial cycle if it is a local
maxima. The order of the decomposition of the state space S
is
nS = min{k ∈ N | E
k+1 = S}
An increasing family of cycles is defined for each x ∈ S as
follows. Define x0 = x. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ nS
xk+1 ∈ Ek+1 such that xk ⊂ xk+1 (10)
Given a set A ⊂ S such that |A| > 1, the maximal proper
partition M(A) is
M(A) = {Π ∈ C(S) | Π is maximal in CA(S)},
where CA(S) = {Π ∈ C(S) | Π ⊂ A,Π 6= A}.
For a cycle Π ∈ C(S),
• order nΠ is
nΠ = min{0 < k < nS | Π ∈ E
k}.
• exit height He(Π) is
He(Π) =
{
max{Hke (Π) | k ≤ nS ,Π ∈ E
k} Π 6= S
∞ Π = S
• mixing height Hm(Π) is
Hm(Π) =
{
max{He(Π
′) | Π′ ∈M(Π)} |Π| > 1
0 |Π| = 1
• potential φ(Π) is
φ(Π) = max{φ(x) | x ∈ Π}
• communication altitude between any two states x and y
is
Ac(x, y) = max
ω∈ΩS(x,y)
min
0≤k≤|ω|
φ(ωk)− V (ωk, ωk+1)
where ωk is the k
th element in the path ω.
• the communication altitude of a cycle Ac(Π) is
Ac(Π) = min
x,y∈Π
Ac(x, y)
The exit and the mixing heights of a cycle provides an
estimate of how long the Markov chain will remain in the
cycle. The potential of a cycle is the maximum potential
of a state within the cycle. The communication altitude was
introduced in [26], and it was shown that Ac(Π) relates
He(Π), Hm(π) and φ(Π) as follows.
Ac(Π) = φ(Π) −Hm(Π)
Ac(Π) = φ(Π
′)−He(Π
′), (13)
for any Π′ ∈M(Π). Another important result form Prop. 2.16
in [26] is
Ac(x, y) = Ac(y, x) = Ac(Πxy) (14)
Algorithm 1 Cycle Decomposition
Require: Define level zero as
E0 := {{x} : x ∈ S}
with communication costs
V 0(x, y) = V (x, y) H0e (x) = He(x).
Ensure: The kth level Ek has been constructed.
1: while Ek 6= S do
2: Form a graph G(Ek, Ek) such that each cycle Ski ∈
Ek is a vertex in G and
(Ski , S
k
j ) ∈ E
k iff V k(Ski , S
k
j ) <∞.
3: Compute the minimum exit cost Hke for every S
k
i ∈
Ek.
Hke (S
k
i ) = min{V
k(Ski , S
k
j ), ∀S
k
j ∈ E
k, Skj 6= S
k
i }
4: For every Ski and S
k
j ∈ E
k, compute V k∗ (S
k
i , S
k
j ).
V k∗ (S
k
i , S
k
j ) = V
k(Ski , S
k
j )−H
k
e (S
k
i )
5: Form a graph G(Ek, Ek∗ ) such that for each vertex
Ski ∈ E
k, (Ski , S
k
j ) ∈ E
k
∗ iff V
k
∗ (S
k
i , S
k
j ) = 0. The graph
G(Ek, Ek∗ ) is a subgraph of G(E
k, Ek).
6: Compute the strongly connected components in
G(Ek, Ek∗ ). G
k+1
s is a strongly connected component of
G(Ek, Ek∗ ) if for every S
k
i and S
k
j in G
k+1
s , there exists
a path ωE
k
Sk
i
,Sk
j
∈ Gk+1s such that V
k
∗ (ω
Ek
Sk
i
,Sk
j
) = 0.
7: Let Dk+1 be the set of strongly connected components
in G(Ek, Ek∗ ). Define a minimum set D
k+1
m as follows
Dk+1m = {G
k+1
s ∈ D
k+1| V∗(S
k
i , S
k
j ) > 0 ∀ S
k
i ∈ G
k+1
s ,
Skj ∈ E
k\Gk+1s }
8: Construct the set Ek+1
Ek+1 = Dk+1m ∪{S
k
i ∈ E
k : Ski /∈ G
k+1
s ∀G
k+1
s ∈ D
k+1
m }
9: For each Sk+1i ∈ E
k+1, define
Hk+1m (S
k+1
i ) = max{H
k
e (S
k
j ) ∀ S
k
j ∈ E
k, Skj ⊂ S
k+1
i }
10: Compute the cost between the sets in Ek+1 as
V k+1(Sk+1i , S
k+1
j ) = H
k+1
m (S
k+1
i )+
min
Skm⊂S
k+1
i
Skn⊂S
k+1
j
V k∗ (S
k
m, S
k
n) (11)
11: k = k + 1.
12: end while
C(S) =
k⋃
l=0
El. (12)
where Πxy is the smallest cycles containing both x and y.
The definition of Ac is adjusted because we are maximizing
a utility instead of minimizing a cost. However, all the results
from [26] remain valid, and play an important role in the
9comparative analysis of LLL and ML.
The main result related to cycles that we will use is from
[18] and [32], and is as follows:
Theorem 5.1: Let Π ∈ C(S). For any ǫ > 0 and for any
x and y in Π
PT
(
e
1
T
(He(Π)−ǫ) < τ∂Π < e
1
T
(He(Π)+ǫ)|X0 = x
)
= 1− o(1)
(15)
PT
(
τy < τ∂Π, τy < e
1
T
(Hm(Π)+ǫ)|X0 = x
)
= 1− o(1)
(16)
as the noise parameter T → 0, where τ∂Π is the exit time of
X from Π and τy is the hitting time for y.
Eq. (15) implies that the exit time of a Markov chain X
from a cycle Π starting from any x ∈ Π is proportional to the
exit height of Π. Moreover, (16) suggests that before leaving
the cycle Π, X will visit all the states within Π exponentially
large number of times. Eqs. (15) and (16) enable us to explain
the behavior of a Markov chain from its cycles. In the next
section, we apply Cycle decomposition to ML and LLL and
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in
explaining the behavior of the corresponding evolutionary
process.
VI. CYCLE DECOMPOSITION FOR ML AND LLL
Before we can carry out comparative analysis using CDA,
we need to establish that both ML and LLL satisfy the criteria
for CDA. The state space for these learning rules is the set of
joint action profiles A = A1 × A2 × · · · × An, where Ai =
{1, 2, . . . ,mi}. We define
|A|max = max{|Ai| | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}
|A|min = min{|Ai| | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}
Proposition 6.1: PMLT and P
LLL
T satisfy the conditions in
(7), (8), and (9).
Proof: To prove this result, we need to show that there
exist cost and Γ functions for both ML and LLL that satisfy
the three equations in the above statement. We begin with
Metropolis learning. Given any pair of distinct action profiles
a and a′ in A, we define
V ML(a, a′) =
{
[Ui(a)− Ui(a
′)]+ ai 6= a
′
i, a−i = a
′
−i
∞ Otherwise
ΓMLT =
1
n|A|max
(17)
where |A|max is the maximum number of actions of any player
in the game. It is straightforward to verify that
lim
T→0
T ln(ΓMLT ) = 0,
and V ML and ΓMLT satisfy (7).
Next, we show that V ML is induced by a potential function
φ. Given any two action profile a and a′, two cases need to
be considered. The first case is when PMLT (a, a
′) = 0, which
implies V ML(a, a′) = V ML(a′, a) = ∞. Thus, both the left
and right sides of (9) are equal to∞. The second case is when
PMLT (a, a
′) > 0. In this case, the action profiles can be written
as a = (α, a−i), a
′ = (α′, a−i). Rearranging (9)
φ(a)− φ(a′) = V ML(a, a′)− V ML(a′, a),
where
V ML(a, a′)− V ML(a′, a) =[Ui(α, a−i)− Ui(α
′
i, a−i)]
+−
[Ui(α
′
i, a−i)− Ui(α, a−i)]
+
= Ui(α, a−i)− Ui(α
′
i, a−i).
For potential games
Ui(α, a−i)− Ui(α
′
i, a−i) = φ(α, a−i)− φ(α
′
i, a−i).
Thus, V ML is induced by a potential function, which concludes
the proof for ML.
For Log-Linear Learning, we define
V LLL(a, a′) =
{
Ui(α
∗, a−i)− Ui(a
′) ai 6= a
′
i, a−i = a
′
−i
∞ Otherwise
ΓLLLT =
1
nZmax
, (18)
where α∗ ∈ Bi(a−i), and
Zmax = max
i∈{1,2,...,n}
Zi,max
Zi,max = max
a−i∈A−i
Zi(a−i).
and Zi(a−i) is defined in (2).
For any given action profile pair a and a′ such that a 6= a′,
lim
T→0
T ln(ΓLLLT ) = 0.
Moreover, V LLL and ΓLLLT as defined above, satisfy (7). For
the weak reversibility condition,
V LLL(a, a′)− V LLL(a′, a) =Ui(α
∗, a−i)− Ui(α
′, a−i)−
Ui(α
∗, a−i) + Ui(α, a)
= Ui(α, a)− Ui(α
′, a−i).
By following the same series of arguments as for ML, we
conclude that V LLL is induced by a potential function φ, which
concludes the proof.
Proposition 6.1 is restricted to LLL and ML. We rewrite (7)
as
ΓT ≤
PT (x, y)
e−
1
T
V (x,y)
≤
1
ΓT
.
By comparing the above inequalities with Def. 2.1, we can
easily verify that for ǫ = e−1/T and V (x, y) = R(x, y)
for every (x, y) pair, any regularly perturbed process P ǫ
satisfies (7) and (8). Moreover, if the game is a potential
game, then it satisfies (9). Thus, the framework of cycle
decomposition applies to any stochastic learning dynamics on
potential games that generate a regularly perturbed Markov
process. The condition of ǫ = e−1/T is not strict and (7) can
easily be expressed with a general noise parameter ǫ. Since
both LLL and ML have ǫ = e−1/T , we will not go into the
details. Thus, from this point onward, we will use the terms
cost and resistance for V (x, y) interchangeably.
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Fig. 3. Output of CDA for the Markov chain shown in Fig. 3(a) under ML are presented in Figs. 3(b)-3(e). Solid circles correspond to non-trivial cycles
and solid edges represent transitions with minimum cost. Moreover, dotted edges represent transitions of higher cost from each state. The edges are labeled
with V k(Ski , S
k
j )/V
k
∗
(Ski , S
k
j ).
A. Stochastic Learning Dynamics Explained by CDA
In the previous section, we proved that CDA applies to both
ML and LLL. Next, we establish that CDA can effectively
explain the medium and long run behaviors of stochastic
learning dynamics through a simple example. We consider a
Markov chain over state space S = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}.
The possible transitions between the states and the energy
landscape over the entire state space are presented in Fig.
3(a). This Markov chain is selected to explain the working
and effectiveness of CDA and is not assumed to be associated
with any particular game.
The outcomes of first (nS − 1) iterations of CDA for ML
are depicted in Figs. 3(b)-3(e). The final iteration results in
a single cycle containing the entire state space. The only
information conveyed by the last level is that the chain is
irreducible, which is already known. Therefore, we start from
G(E3, E3) as presented in Fig. 3(e). The set E3 comprises a
singleton {a} with H3e ({a}) = 0, and a non-trivial cycle of
order three, containing all the remaining states with exit height
of 14. Based on this level and Thm. 5.1, we can deduce that
if the initial condition is {a}, the Markov chain will leave this
state quickly as the noise parameter T → 0, and will hit a
large cycle containing all the other states. This cycle has an
exit height of 14, which implies that the time to exit from this
cycle will be proportional to e14/T . Moreover, the chain will
visit all the states within this big cycle an exponential number
of times before exiting. Therefore, for a system with a finite
lifetime and initial condition {a}, we can safely conclude that
the system will leave {a} quickly and will never revisit it for
all practical purposes.
However, what happens when the chain leaves {a} or if
the initial condition is not in {a}? These questions cannot
be answered adequately from G(E3, E3). To answer these
questions, we need to go one level lower to the output of the
second iteration G(E2, E2). Graph G(E2, E2) demonstrates
that the non-trivial cycle in E3 is composed of a singleton
{c}, one non-trivial cycle {b} of order zero and exit height
three, and another non-trivial cycle {d, e, f, g, h, i} of order
two and exit height 11.
Graph G(E2, E2) offers more details about the behavior of
the Markov chain as compared to G(E3, E3). It reveals that
after exiting from {a}, the Markov chain will hit {b} where
it will get stuck for a time proportional to e3/T . On exiting
{b}, the chain will hit {c} with high probability as T → 0
because the transition from {b} to {c} is the transition of
minimum cost from {b}. From {c}, the chain can either return
to {b}, or move on to {d, e, f, g, h, i} with equal probabilities.
However, once it hits {d, e, f, g, h, i}, it will stay within this
cycle for most of the time because the exit height of this
cycle is 11 which is more than three times the exit height of
{b}. Thus, we can conclude from G(E2, E2) that in the long
run, the Markov chain will spend most of its time within the
cycle {d, e, f, g, h, i} after the short and medium run behavior
described above.
Similarly, we can explain the behavior within
{d, e, f, g, h, i} by examining G(E1, E1) presented in
Fig. 3(c). Although switching form G(E3, E3) to G(E2, E2)
furnished more information, there is one drawback. Given
that the Markov chain is at a state other than {a}, we cannot
easily approximate the hitting time of {a} from G(E2, E2).
Similarly, switching from G(E2, E2) to G(E1, E1) can
provide more information about the behavior of the chain
restricted to the set of states {d, e, f, g, h, i}. However, we
can lose high-level information about the transition behavior
between {d, e, f, g, h, i} and the other states in the state space.
Thus, switching from the output of a high-level iteration to
a low-level iteration of CDA delivers information of higher
resolution. However, this high-resolution information is
restricted to small subsets of state space. On the other hand,
moving from a lower level to a higher level of CDA yields
high-level details on transitions from one set of states to
another set of states but abstracts away low-level information.
Regardless of which level of CDA we are analyzing, the key
parameter that enables us to describe system behavior through
CDA is the exit height of a cycle, which depends on the mixing
height of that cycles according to (11). To verify this claim, we
apply CDA under LLL on the chain in Fig.3(a), and compare
the output with output under ML discussed before. The outputs
of the first iteration under ML and the second iteration under
LLL are presented in Fig. VII-A. The first observation is that
both the graphs have the same cycles but different transition
costs. The difference in transition costs is highlighted in the
figure with a different color.
Assuming that a is the initial condition, both the dynamics
11
have the same behavior till the chain reaches the state c. At
c, ML can transition to b or {d, e, f} with equal probability.
However, LLL will transition to {d, e, f} with high probability
since the transition to b has a high cost. Thus, LLL will hit
the cycle {d, e, f} faster as compared to ML. However, the
exit height of this cycle under LLL is six which is one unit
higher than the exit height under ML. The difference in exit
heights implies that although ML will reach {d, e, f} late, it
has the ability to leave this cycle quickly as compared to LLL.
After exiting from {d, e, f}, both the chains will hit the state
g. From the state g, ML can transition back to {d, e, f} or
to {h, i} with equal probability, where state i is the potential
maximizer. However, LLL will return to {d, e, f} with high
probability because the transition cost to {h, i} is high. This
comparative analysis of the chain in Fig. 3(a) revealed that if
a is the initial condition LLL will initially proceed towards
the potential maximizer faster as compared to ML. However,
it can get stuck in a cycle longer than ML. Moreover, ML has
a zero cost path to potential maximizer from g whereas no
such path exists for LLL.
The comparison of LLL and ML based on Fig. VII-A
signifies the importance of the qualities of the paths that lead
to a stochastically stable state from any given initial condition.
Furthermore, it highlights the importance of exit height in
explaining system behavior. Thus, for comparative analysis,
we will compare the mixing and exit heights of cycles under
ML and LLL. In this work, the comparison is restricted to
subsets of state space that are cycles under both LLL and
ML.
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ML AND LLL
In this section, we present the main results of this work
related to the comparative analysis of stochastic learning
dynamics in games. Although the results are presented in the
context of LLL and ML, the techniques can be extended to
any learning dynamics that satisfy the criteria in (7), (8), and
(9). We divide the comparative analysis into first order and
higher order analysis.
A. First Order Analysis
In the first order analysis, we compare the expected hitting
times to the set of Nash equilibria for both the learning rules.
We first derive upper bounds on the expected hitting times to
the set of Nash equilibria and present a comparative analysis
of these bounds. Then, we determine a sufficient condition to
guarantee that the expected hitting time to the set of Nash
equilibria will be smaller for LLL then ML from any given
initial action profile. For analysis purposes, we assume that
for any action profile pair a and a′ such that PT (a, a
′) > 0
φ(a) 6= φ(a′). (19)
This is not a restrictive assumption and is placed for simplify-
ing the analysis. Otherwise, if φ(a) = φ(a′) and PT (a, a
′) >
0, we can simple merge a and a′ into a single state.
Let M be the set of all the Nash equilibria in S, and let
τ lM be the hitting time to M under a learning rule l where
0/0 6/3
3/0 4/4
0/0 7/1
a
b
c
g
6/0 0/0
3/3 17/0
d,e,f
h,i
0/0
0/0
a
b
c
g
0/0
0/0 9/0
d,e,f
0/0 7/2
5/0
6/3
3/0
h,i
(a) ML: G(E1, E1) (b) LLL: G(E2, E2)
Fig. 4. Comparison of ML and LLL based on CDA
l ∈ {LLL,ML}. Given any path ω = (a0, a1, . . . , ap−1), let
P lω = P (Xs = as for all s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}).
Here P lω is the probability that the Markov chain moves along
the path ω under learning dynamics l. From (7),
(ΓlT )
pe−
1
T
V l(ω) ≤ P lω ≤
1
(ΓlT )
p
e−
1
T
V l(ω),
We define
Ωl(a,M) = {wAa,a∗ | a
∗ ∈M and V l(wAa,a∗) = 0},
i.e., Ωl(a,M) is the set of zero cost paths from action profile
a to M under l ∈ {LLL,ML}. The set of zero cost paths from
any initial condition is
Ωl =
⋃
a∈A
Ωl(a,M).
Let
ξl(a) = max{|ω| : ω ∈ Ωl(a,M)}, and
σl(a) = min{|ω| : ω ∈ Ωl(a,M)},
where ξl(a) is the length of the longest paths from a to M
under l and σl(a) is the length of the shortest paths from a
to M under l. Before presenting the main results, we need to
prove the following propositions.
Proposition 7.1: If an action profile a /∈ M , then
ΩLLL(a,M) and ΩML(a,M) are non-empty for a finite state
space A.
Proof: The result is proved for LLL because the proof
for ML is exactly the same. We establish that ΩLLL(a,M) is
non-empty by showing that we can always construct a path
that belongs to this set.
Let ω0 = {a}. Assume that there does not exist any a
′ ∈ A
such that V LLL(a, a′) = 0. This will imply that a ∈M , which
is a contradiction. Thus, there exists an action profile a1 ∈ A
such that V LLL(a, a1) = 0. Define ω1 = ω0∪{a1}. If a1 ∈M ,
we are done and ω1 ∈ Ω
LLL(a,M). If a1 /∈M , we can argue
in the same manner as before that there exists an action profile
a2 ∈ A such that V LLL(a1, a2) = 0. Define ω2 = ω1 ∪ a2. By
repeating this argument k times, we obtain
ωk = {a0, a1, . . . , ak−1, ak}, where a0 = a.
The condition in (19) implies that φ(al) > φ(al+1) for all
l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. Thus, all the action profiles in the path
ω are unique. The uniqueness of the elements of ω ensures that
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this process terminates in finite number of steps, say p, since
A has finite number of elements. Then ωp ∈ Ω
LLL(a,M)
The argument of ML is exactly the same. In fact, Prop. 7.1
is valid for any Markov chain that satisfies Eqs. (7).
Proposition 7.2: For LLL and ML, ΩLLL(a,M) ⊆
ΩML(a,M).
Proof: For any pair of distinct action profiles a and a′
V LLL(a, a′) = 0 =⇒ V ML(a, a′) = 0,
but the converse is not true. To prove this statement, let a =
(α, a−i) and a
′ = (α′, a−i) be two action profiles in A. If
V LLL(a, a′) = 0, then α′ ∈ Bi(a−i), i.e., α
′ is a best response
of player i to a−i. Thus,
Ui(a
′)− Ui(a) > 0 =⇒ V
ML(a, a′) = 0.
To show that the converse is not true, let V ML(a, a′) = 0,
which implies that Ui(α
′, a−i) − (α, a−i) > 0. However, if
α′ /∈ Bi(a−i) then V
LLL(a, a′) > 0. Thus, given an action
profile a, all the zero cost paths from a to M under LLL
are also zero cost paths under ML. However, a zero cost path
in ML does not necessarily has zero cost under LLL, which
concludes the proof.
Proposition 7.3: The ΓT functions satisfying (7) for LLL
and ML have the following relation
ΓLLLT ≥ Γ
ML
T . (20)
Proof: Recall from (17) and (18) that
ΓMLT =
1
n|A|max
and ΓLLLT =
1
nZmax
.
For any player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any action profile a−i ∈
A−i
Zi(a−i) =
∑
α¯∈Ai
e−
1
T
(Ui(α
∗,a−i)−Ui(α¯,a−i)) ≤ |Ai|
Thus, Zmax ≤ |A|max, which concludes the proof.
Next, we present our first result for the first order compar-
ative analysis.
Theorem 7.1: There exists constants ηLLL and ηML that
lie in the interval (0, |A|) such that
E(τLLLM ) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
(
ΓLLLT
)ηLLL)[t/ηLLL]
dt <∞
(21)
E(τLLLM ) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
(
ΓMLT
)ηML)[t/ηML]
dt <∞
such that ηML ≤ ηLLL. Here [c] is the integer part of the real
number c.
Proof: Let X be a non-negative continuous random
variable. Then, the expected value of X is
E(X) =
∫ ∞
0
P (X > x)dx
To prove (21), we will first compute point-wise upper bounds
for the probabilities
P (τ lM > t) for l ∈ {LLL,ML},
and show that the computed bounds are integrable. Then, we
will use the fact that if f and g are integrable functions over
the interval (0,∞), then
f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ (0,∞)
implies ∫ ∞
0
f(x)dx ≤
∫ ∞
0
g(x)dx
We begin the proof with LLL. From Prop. 7.1 we know that
given any initial condition, there exists a path of zero cost in
the set ΩLLL with length less than or equal to σLLLmax , where
σLLLmax = max
a∈A
σLLL(a)
In the above expression σLLL(a) is the length of the shortest
zero cost path from a toM . Thus, for t = σLLLmax , the following
holds
P (τLLLM > t) = 1− P (τ
LLL
M ≤ t)
≤ 1− P (τLLLM = t)
≤ 1−
(
ΓLLLT
)σLLLmax
where
(
ΓLLLT
)σLLLmax is a lower bound on the probability of
moving along a zero cost path of length σLLLmax . Thus, for any
t > σLLLmax ,
P (τLLLM > t) ≤
(
1− P (τLLLM = t)
)[t/σLLLmax ]
≤
(
1−
(
ΓLLLT
)σLLLmax)[t/σLLLmax ]
By setting
ηLLL = σLLLmax ,
we get the desired result, where σLLLmax is the maximum of the
minimum path lengths from any initial condition in A.
We repeat the same steps for ML. For any initial condition,
there always exists a zero cost path to M under ML of length
less than or equal to σMLmax, where
σMLmax = max
a∈A
σML(a)
Therefore, for t = σMLmax,
P (τMLM > t) ≤ 1− P (τ
ML
M = t)
≤ 1−
(
ΓMLT
)σMLmax .
For any t > σMLmax, the above inequality leads to
P (τLLLM > t) ≤
(
1−
(
ΓMLT
)σMLmax)[t/σMLmax] ,
where
ηML = σMLmax,
yields the desired result.
The function (
1−
(
ΓlT
)σlmax)[t/σlmax]
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is monotonically decreasing and is bounded from below by
zero for l ∈ {LLL,ML}. Therefore, the integrals in (21) are
bounded, which concludes the proof for (21).
Finally, we prove that σMLmax ≤ σ
LLL
max . From Prop. 7.2, every
zero cost path to M under LLL is also a zero cost path to
M under ML. Moreover, the number of zero cost paths from
any initial condition to M under ML is always greater than or
equal to the corresponding number of paths under LLL. Thus,
for any initial condition a ∈ A, there can exist paths of shorter
lengths in ΩML(a,M) than the paths in ΩLLL(a,M), which
implies
σML(a) ≤ σLLL(a) for all a ∈ A
Therefore,
σMLmax ≤ σ
LLL
max ,
which concludes the proof of Thm. 7.1.
We can develop interesting insights into the behavior of LLL
and ML from the results in Thm. 7.1. The upper bounds on
the expected hitting times to the set of Nash equilibria in (21)
depend on two parameters ΓlT and σ
l
max for l ∈ {LLL,ML}.
We have already proved that σMLmax ≤ σ
LLL
max because there can
be paths of shorter lengths to the set M under ML then LLL.
This inequality favors ML in the context of expected hitting
time to the set M . However, from Prop. 7.3,
ΓLLLT ≥ Γ
ML
T ,
which favors LLL in the context of expected hitting time
to the set M . The parameter ΓMLT is smaller than Γ
LLL
T
because ΓMLT is inversely related to the maximum number of
actions available to a player. Thus, as the size of action set
increases, the time required to transition to an action profile
with higher potential also increases because ML only allows
pairwise comparisons for decision making. Therefore, if the
delay introduced because of limited available information,
which is reflected in ΓMLT , dominates the advantage due to
shorter path lengths, which is reflected in σMLmax, the expected
hitting time to M will be smaller for LLL then for ML.
Next, we present a sufficient condition on the minimum
number of actions of a player to guarantee that the expected
hitting time to the set of Nash equilibria for LLL will be
smaller than ML.
Theorem 7.2: The expected hitting time to the set of Nash
equilibria M is guaranteed to be smaller for LLL than ML
i.e.,
E(τLLLM ) ≤ E(τ
ML
M ),
if
|Amin| ≥
1
n
(
1
ΓLLLT
)MPLR
(22)
as T → 0. Here
MPLR = max
a∈A
ξLLL(a)
σML(a)
(23)
MPLR stands for Maximum Path Length Ratio, which is the
maximum ratio of the length of the longest zero cost path from
a toM under LLL and the length of the shortest zero cost path
from a to M under ML, over all a ∈ A.
Proof: Consider a pair of paths ω and ω′ such that ω ∈
ΩLLL(a,M) and ω′ ∈ ΩML(a,M). In the limit as T → 0, the
probability that a Markov chain satisfying (7) and (8) travels
along a path of zero cost is exponentially more as compared
to a path of non-zero cost [17]. Therefore, only the paths of
zero cost matter as T → 0. Since the time required to traverse
a path is inversely related to the probability of moving along
that path, we will prove the theorem by showing that, if (22)
is satisfied, then
PLLLω ≥ P
ML
ω′ ,
i.e., the probability of following any zero cost path in
ΩLLL(a,M) under LLL will be more than following a zero
cost path in ΩML(a,M) under ML.
Consider a path ω = (a0, a1, . . . , ap), and let
(i0, i1, . . . , ip−1) be the sequence of players that update
their actions. If ω belongs to both ΩLLL(a0,M) and
ΩML(a0,M), then
PLLLω =
p−1∏
m=0
1
nZim(a−im)
≥
(
ΓLLLT
)p
PMLω =
p−1∏
m=0
1
n|Aim |
≤
(
1
n|A|min
)p
Since Zi(a−i) ≤ Ai for every i, the above expressions
show that the probability of traversing a path under LLL is
higher than traversing the same path under under ML. The
difference between the two probabilities increases as a function
of the length of the path and number of actions available to
each agent. Let ωmax and ωmin be paths in Ω
LLL(a,M) and
ΩML(a,M) with lengths ξLLL(a) and σML(a) respectively.
Here ωmin is a path with maximum length in Ω
LLL(a,M)
and ωmin is a path of minimum length in Ω
ML(a,M). Then
PLLLωmax ≥
(
ΓLLLT
)ξLLL(a)
and PMLωmin ≤
(
1
n|A|min
)σML(a)
To derive the condition in the theorem statement, we need
PLLLωmax ≥ P
ML
ωmax
which implies that
(
ΓLLLT
)ξLLL(a)
≥
(
1
n|A|min
)σML(a)
By taking logarithm of both sides, and performing simple
algebraic manipulations, get
|Amin| ≥
1
n
(
1
ΓLLLT
) ξLLL(a)
σML(a)
By replacing ξLLL(a)/σML(a) with MPLR, the above in-
equality holds for all a ∈ A, which concludes the proof.
B. Higher Order Comparative Analysis
In the higher order analysis, we compare the mixing heights
and the exit heights of the subsets of state space S that are
cycles under both LLL and ML. We show that both the mixing
and exit heights of a cycle are smaller forML then LLL. These
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results imply that after entering a cycle, ML will visit all the
states inside the cycle quickly as compared to LLL and will
exit the cycle faster. We start by examining the transition cost
between states for both the learning rules.
Proposition 7.4: The cost between any two action profiles
a and a′ satisfies
V LLL(a, a′) ≥ VML(a, a′) (24)
Proof: Let a = (α, a−i) and a
′ = (α′, a−i) by any two
action profiles in A. To prove the proposition, we need to
analyze three cases based on the definitions in (18) and (17).
Case1: α′ ∈ Bi(a−i).
If α′ belongs to the best response set of player i for a−i,
then
V LLL(a, a′) = VML(a, a′) = 0
Case 2: α′ /∈ Bi(a−i) and Ui(α
′, a−i) ≥ Ui(α, a−i).
In this case α′ is not the best response to a−i. However,
it does not result in a decrease in utility as compared to α.
Therefore,
V ML(a, a′) = 0,
Let α∗ ∈ Bi(a−i). Then,
V LLL(a, a′) = Ui(α
∗, a−i)− Ui(α
′, a−i)
> V ML(a, a′)
Case 3: Ui(α
′, a−i) < Ui(α, a−i)
In this case the target action α′ results in a decrease in
utility as compared to the current action α.
V ML(a, a−i) = Ui(α, a−i)− Ui(α
′, a−i)
and
V LLL(a, a′) = Ui(α
∗, a−i)− Ui(α
′, a−i), α
∗ ∈ Bi(a−i)
≥ VML(a, a−i).
The equality holds if α ∈ Bi(a−i).
Theorem 7.3: For a cycle Π such that Π ∈ CML and Π ∈
CLLL, the following inequality holds
HLLLm (Π) ≥ H
ML
m (Π) (25)
Proof: To prove this theorem, we first explicitly compute
HMLm (Π), the mixing height of Π under ML. Then, we show
that the mixing height of Π under LLL can never be smaller
than HMLm (Π).
Proposition 7.5: Let Π ∈ CML(S). Then the mixing height
HMLm (Π) is
HMLm (Π) = φ(Π) −min
a∈Π
φ(a) (26)
where φ(Π) = max
a∈Π
φ(a).
Proof: From (13), mixing height, potential, and the alti-
tude of communication of a cycle Π are related as follows
Hm(Π) = φ(Π) −Ac(Π).
We need to show that
AMLc (Π) = φ(af ),
where
af = argmin
a∈Π
φ(a)
i.e., af is an action profile in Π with minimum potential. Using
the concept of increasing family of cycles with respect to a
state in the state space presented in (10), the cycle Π can be
represented as
Π = anΠf
where nΠ is the order of Π. Based on the same concept, a
nΠ−1
f
is a cycle of order nπ−1 that belongs toM(Π), the maximal
partition of Π, and contains af . Since af was an action profile
with minimum potential in Π, it is also a minimum potential
action profile in a
nΠ−1
f . Let aˆ be another action profile in Π
such that aˆ /∈ anΠ−1f . Therefore, Π is the minimum cycle
containing both af and aˆ, which implies that by using (14),
the communication altitude of Π is
Ac(Π) = Ac(af , aˆ) (27)
Given any two action profiles a and a′ in Π
AMLc (a, a
′) = max
ω∈ΩS(a,a′)
min
0≤k≤|ω|−1
(
φ(wk)− V
ML(wk, wk+1)
)
where ω is a path from a to a′ and ωk is the k
th action profile
in ω. We know that
V ML(ak, ak+1) =
{
0 φ(ak+1) ≥ φ(ak)
φ(ak)− φ(ak+1) φ(ak+1) < φ(ak)
Therefore,
min
0≤k≤|ω|−1
{φ(wk)− V
ML(wk, wk+1)} = min
a∈ω
φ(a).
The above equation implies that
AMLc (a, a
′) = max
ω∈ΩS(a,a′)
min
a∈ω
φ(a) (28)
Since af has the minimum potential in Π, every path ω ∈
Ω(af , aˆ) such that ω ∈ Π satisfies
min
a∈ω
φ(a) = φ(af ).
For a path ω′ /∈ Π, it is possible that
min
a∈ω′
φ(a) < φ(af ).
However, the definition of Ac(a, a
′) has a maximum over all
the paths between a and a′. Therefore,
Ac(Π) = Ac(af , aˆ) = φ(af ),
which concludes the proof of the proposition.
Next, we will show that ALLLc can never ge greater than
AMLc . For a path ω ∈ Ω
S(a, a′), let (i1, i2, . . . , i|ω|) be
the sequence of players updating their actions. Then, for
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |ω| − 1}
V LLL(ak, ak+1) =
{
0 α′ ∈ Bi(a−i)
φ(a∗k)− φ(ak+1) Otherwise
where a∗k = (α
∗, a−ik), α
∗ ∈ Bik(a−ik). Thus,
ALLLc (a, a
′) = max
ω∈ΩS(a,a′)
min
0≤k≤|ω|−1
φ(ak)− (φ(a
∗
k)− φ(ak+1))
(29)
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Since (φ(a∗k)− φ(ak+1)) ≥ 0,
min
0≤k≤|ω|−1
φ(ak)− (φ(a
∗
k)− φ(ak+1)) ≤ min
a∈ω
φ(a)
which implies that ALLLc (Π) ≤ A
ML
c (Π). Thus,
HLLLm (Π) ≥ H
ML
m (Π),
which concludes the proof of the theorem.
Next, we are interested in a similar result for the exit
heights.
Theorem 7.4: For a cycle Π such that Π ∈ CML and Π ∈
CLLL, the following inequality holds
HLLLe (Π) ≥ H
ML
e (Π) (30)
Proof: According to Prop. 4.15 in [32], the exit height of
a cycle Π can be computed as follows
He(Π) = min
a∈Π
max
a′∈A\Π
φ(a)−Ac(a, a
′) (31)
For any pair of action profiles a and a′,
AMLc (a, a
′) = max
ω∈ΩS(a,a′)
min
a∈ω
φ(a)
ALLLc (a, a
′) = max
ω∈ΩS(a,a′)
min
0≤k≤|ω|−1
φ(ak)− (φ(a
∗
k)− φ(ak+1)),
which implies that
AMLc (a, a
′) ≥ ALLLc (a, a
′)
between any pair of action profiles. Combining this fact with
(31)
HLLLe (Π) = min
a∈Π
max
a′∈A\Π
φ(a)−ALLLc (a, a
′)
≥ min
a∈Π
max
a′∈A\Π
φ(a)−AMLc (a, a
′)
= HMLe (Π),
which concludes the proof of the theorem. In fact, the result
in [19] is not restricted to a cycle and is applicable to any
subset of the state space. For any D ⊂ A, the exit height is
He(D) = min
a∈D
max
a′∈A\D
φ(a)−AMLc (a, a
′)
Thus,
HLLLe (D) ≥ H
ML
e (D)
for any D ⊂ A.
Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 confirm our observations from the
sensor coverage game that ML can exit from any set of action
profiles faster as compared to LLL. However, the proofs of
these theorems provide more insight related to the comparison
of the exit and mixing heights of both the dynamics. In fact,
comparing (28) and (29) provides a quantitative comparison
between the mixing and exit heights of ML and LLL. These
equations imply that the critical factor contributing to compar-
atively high exit and mixing heights of LLL is the maximum
difference in utilities between any two actions in the action
set of a player given the actions of all the other players. This
quantitative explanation is intuitive because, in LLL, the cost
of noisy action depends on the payoff at the best response. In
contrast, the cost of noisy action is computed by comparing
it with the action in the previous time step.
VIII. CDA FOR SENSOR COVERAGE GAME
We compared the performance of sensor coverage game
under LLL and ML based on CDA. We selected a small
setup with three sensors in a grid of size 10 × 10 to
keep the system tractable. The sensor were located at
{(9.03, 3.98), (8.4, 1.4), (1.96, 6.35)}. Each sensor had a fixed
sensing range, which enabled us to represent the action set
as on or off, i.e., Ai = {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus,
the size of the state space was eight from s0 to s7. The
state si corresponded to the joint action profile that is the
binary equivalent of of i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7}. There are two
equilibrium configurations s3 and s5, where s3 = {0, 1, 1}
and s5 = {1, 0, 1}. Moreover, s5 is the potential maximizer.
The results are presented in Fig. 5.
For three sensors, there were eight possible configurations,
The utility of each configuration along with a state transition
diagram is presented in 5(a), which is same for both the
dynamics. The outputs of all the iterations of CDA for ML
and LLL are presented in the figures ranging from 5(b)-5(f)
and 5(g)-5(l) respectively. A simple comparison of the two
sets of figures verified the analysis presented in the previous
section. The cycles in the iterations 2−5 for ML and 3−6 for
LLL were the same, as shown in figures 5(c)-5(f) and 5(i)-5(l)
respectively. For each of these cycles, HLLLe ≥ H
ML
e .
For the initial condition s0 = (0, 0, 0), the difference in the
paths to stochastically stable states can also be observed from
Figs. 5(b) and 5(g)-5(h). In the case of ML, the sensor config-
uration can reach either of the two equilibrium configurations
through s1, resulting in the formation of the cycle {s1, s3, s5}.
However, under LLL, the sensor configuration will first hit
the potential maximizer s5 through s1 as shown by the cycle
{s1, s5}. In the next iteration, s4 is added to the cycle instead
of s3, which signifies that the network configuration will cycle
between the states s5, s1, and s4 exponentially many times
before hitting s3 for the first time.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We highlighted a critical issue with stochastic stability as a
solution concept, which is its inability to distinguish between
learning rules that lead to the same steady-state behavior. To
address this problem, we presented a comprehensive frame-
work for analyzing and comparing the transient performance
of such learning dynamics. In the proposed framework, the
main contribution was to identify cycle decomposition of
Markov chains as a set of tools that enabled the comparative
analysis of the stochastic learning dynamics. Moreover, we
selected the expected hitting time to the set of Nash equilibria
and the exit time from a subset of state space as important
parameters to compare the performance of stochastic learning
rules. We selected LLL and ML as representative members of
the class of stochastic learning dynamics and showed that both
of these dynamics have the same stochastically stable states,
but significantly different short and medium run behavior.
Based on the proposed comparative analysis framework, we
identified critical factors, which effect the expected hitting
time to the set of Nash equilibria for LLL and ML. We also
proved that the exit time from a subset of state space will
always be higher for LLL as compared to ML.
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φ(s0) = 0
{0, 0, 0}
φ(s2) = 26
{0, 1, 0}
φ(s4) = 37
{1, 0, 0}
φ(s6) = 18
{1, 1, 0}
φ(s1) = 41
{0, 0, 1}
φ(s3) = 44
{0, 1, 1}
φ(s5) = 50
{1, 0, 1}
φ(s7) = 27
{1, 1, 1}
(a) G(E0, E0)
s0
s2 s4
s7
s6
{s1, s3, s5}
0/0 0/0
0/0
26/26
37/37
0/0
0/0
0/0
8/8
19/19
13/024/9
9/9
0/0
0/0
50/37
23/10 0/0
(b) G(E1, E1)
s0
s2
s7
s6
{s1, s3, s4, s5}
0/0
0/0
26/26
0/0
0/0
8/8
24/1
9/9
0/0
50/27
23/0 0/0
32/9
0/0
(c) G(E2, E2)
s0
s2
s6
{s1, s3, s4, s5, s7}
0/0
0/0
26/26
0/0
8/8
24/0
0/0
50/26
0/0
32/8
(d) G(E3, E3)
s0
s6
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s7}
0/0
50/18
0/0
32/0
(e) G(E4, E4)
s0
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7}
0/0
50/0
(f)
G(E5, E5)
4/4
50/50
32/32
0/0
26/26
14/1
3/0
17/14
6/6
18/15
15/15
44/44
0/0
59/46
11/11
0/0
{s1, s5}
s0
s2 s4
s6
s7
s3
0/0
10/10
32/32
0/0
13/0
23/10
(g) G(E1, E1)
26/26
14/0
3/0
17/14
6/6
18/15
15/15
44/44
0/0
59/45
11/11
0/0
{s1, s4, s5}
s0
s2
s6
s7
s3
10/10
32/32
0/0
45/31
0/0
23/9
(h) G(E2, E2)
15/15
44/44 0/0
59/36
{s1, s3, s4, s5}
s0
s2
s6s7
23/0
0/0
0/0
41/18
29/6
0/0
10/10
32/32
(i) G(E3, E3)
15/15
44/44
0/0
59/30
{s1, s3, s4, s5, s7}
s0
s2
s6
0/0
41/12
29/0
0/0
(j) G(E4, E4)
59/18
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s7}
s0
s6
0/0
41/0
0/0
(k) G(E5, E5)
59/0
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7}
s0
0/0
(l) G(E6, E6)
Fig. 5. Output of CDA for the sensor coverage game with N = 3 and Ai = {0, 6}, under ML and LLL. Fig. 5(a) shows the zeroth level, which is same
for both the dynamics. Figs. 5(b)-Fig. 5(e) present the outputs under ML and Fig. 5(g)-5(l) present the outputs for LLL.
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